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BOOK REVIEWS

The Openness of God, by Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders,
William Hasker, and David Basinger. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1994. Pp. 202.
EDWARD WIERENGA, University of Rochester
The five authors of this book each contribute a chapter in defense of
what they call the "openness of God". They aim to present this view to
a broader audience "beyond the confines of professional theologians
and philosophers" (9). Accordingly, they give less attention to detail
and to developed argument than one would expect in a volume
addressed primarily to philosophers. Thus, for example, the view in
question is summarized simply as: "God grants humans significant
freedom to cooperate with or work against God's will for their lives, and
he enters into dynamic, give-and-take relationships with us" (7). Behind
this simple formulation, however, lies a complex web of theological and
philosophical claims. First, the authors deny that God has the traditional attributes of simplicity, impassibility, immutability, and eternality.
Second, they hold that God is omniscient, but only in an attenuated
sense. In particular, God's knowledge of the future extends only to
what is causally determined by present conditions and to what God
knows that he himself will do: God does not have foreknowledge of
what free agents other than he will do. And divine omniscience does
not include middle knowledge or knowledge of what free creatures
would do in various alternative circumstances. Third, God has created
human beings with libertarian free will, and he has a "commitment to
the welfare of his creatures" and a "profound sensitivity to their experiences" (58), but he does not ordinarily "override" their freedom (156).
Put thus starkly, these theses sound like ones that have been
endorsed by many other writers. The authors of this volume, however,
are prepared to embrace such particulars as that God is surprised by
what happens (94), that creatures can have an effect on God (22), and that
he comes to regret those of his actions that turn out to be mistaken or
wrong (27, 117). Having made this departure from the traditional view
of God, they are forced to make adjustments in other areas of theology.
Thus they hold that election is "a summons to service, not a guarantee of
salvation" (57), that all prophecy regarding future free acts of creatures,
including Jesus' prophecy of Peter's denial (Matt 26:34), is conditional (55,
153)\ that since things can turn out differently than God envisioned, following God's will can turn out badly (165), and that God permits evil to
happen to us even though it is not required either for bringing about a
greater good or for avoiding a worse evil (152).
248

BOOK REVIEWS

249

In Chapter I, in contrast to the traditional view of God, which "emphasizes God's sovereignty, majesty, and glory" (11), Richard Rice attempts to
marshall biblical evidence for "an interactive view of God's relation to the
world [according to which] what happens [in the world] affects God
somehow-by evoking a certain emotion, a change in attitude, a change in
plans" (18). Among Old Testament passages, Rice give particular prominence to texts that describe God as repenting, for example, "The LORD was
sorry that he had made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to his
heart" (Gen. 6:6 NRSV), and "The LORD was sorry that he had made Saul
king over Israel" (1 Sam. 15:35). In the New Testament Rice draws conclusions about the nature of God from the life and ministry of Jesus, justifying this move, in part, by claiming that "the fact that God chose to express
himself through the medium of a human life suggests that God's experience has something in common with certain aspects of human experience" (39). (Rice does not say what may be deduced about the nature of
God's experience from the obvious, parallel reasoning that God also chose
to express himself through the written word.)
In Chapter 2 John Sanders asks how the "prima facie meaning of the
texts cited in favor of the openness of God is commonly overturned in
favor of another interpretation" (59). His answer is that Christian theology was Hellenized. To support this interpretation, Sanders first gives a
brief summary of Greek philosophy and of Philo of Alexandria, and
then he presents a history of Christian theology. The latter runs from
the fathers through Augustine, pauses briefly for the Middle Ages and
the Reformation, and then leaps to the twentieth century. Sanders
protests that, throughout this history, theologians, under the influence of
Greek ideas of divinity, resisted interpreting the Bible in a straightforward way, that, for example, "biblical texts that suggest that God
changed his mind, was surprised by human action[,] or suffered are
explained as anthropomorphisms" (94); the resulting theology Sanders
describes as "the biblical-classical synthesis."
Clark Pinnock takes up, in Chapter 3, the task of proposing "a more
biblical and coherent doctrine of God" (101). Like Sanders he deplores
the "excessive Hellenization" of traditional theology, and like Rice he
takes the Bible to teach that God reacts to the world and changes his
plans, that, for example, "when God saw the extent of human wickedness on the earth, he was sorry that he had made humankind" (117).
Occasionally Pinnock seems especially extravagant, as when, for example, he says that "to speak more of God's power than of weakness ... [is] a
theological distortion" (105) or when he says that according to social
trinitarianism (which he accepts) "God is the perfection of love and communion, the very antithesis of self-sufficiency [emphasis added]" (108).
In Chapter 4 William Hasker, as befits a regular contributor to this
journal, offers a philosophical defense of the open view of God. Hasker
delineates five theories about God's knowledge of and relation to the
world: theological determinism (which he unfortunately calls
"Calvinism"2), Molinism (the doctrine that God has middle knowledge),
the theory of simple foreknowledge, the open view, and process theology. Hasker argues that the open view is superior to the others on this
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list. In particular, he claims that the open view provides the best
account of our relationship with God and the best response to the problem of evil. I shall discuss these contentions below.
In the final chapter David Basinger draws out applications of the
open view for petitionary prayer, divine guidance, human suffering, and
social and evangelistic responsibility.
In the space that remains I want to comment critically on some of the
issues William Hasker raises. To a considerable extent Hasker's reasons
in favor of the open view depend upon positions he has written about
extensively elsewhere, in particular, his insistence that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human free action and his contention
that God does not have middle knowledge. 3 I think that these positions
have been adequately disputed elsewhere,4 and so I will not address
them here. Instead, I will focus on two advantages Hasker claims for the
open view against its leading competitors. First, Hasker maintains that
the open view provides for an "appealing" or "attractive" conception of
"our personal relationship with God" (150-1). Hasker claims that theological determinism, in contrast, makes the relation between God and
people like that of "a puppet-master controlling a puppet, or a ventriloquist having a 'conversation' with his dummy" (142), which evidently
does not make for a meaningful relationship. Molinism does not fare
much better. Here God is an "archmanipulator," like a "cyberneticist"
who completely understands his robot's program, even if he did not
write all of the code (145-146).
Let us focus on just the comparison with Molinism. Hasker apparently thinks that if I realize that God has taken into account his knowledge
of how I would react in various circumstances in planning which situations in which to place me-all with the aim of drawing me closer to
him as well as furthering his plan for others-I may reasonably feel
manipulated, a feeling which will damage my relationship with God. I
will question in a moment whether this is an appropriate response. If it
is, however, the open view seems no better. On this view, God has
taken into account his knowledge of how I am likely to react in various
circumstances in planning what situations to place me in-and he has at
his disposal vast knowledge and power-again with the aim of drawing
me close to him as well as furthering his plan for others. If feeling
manipulated was appropriate in the first instance, it would seem to be
equally appropriate in this case. In fact, on the open view, why should I
not feel not only manipulated but placed at risk, since on the open view
God does not know that his action will turn out well? And if I think that
God is not only manipulating me but taking chances with me, as well,
that is no less likely to interfere with my relationship with him. So the
open view does not seem to be an improvement, on this score, over the
Molinist alternative.
I should add, however, that I do not really think that feeling manipulated is the appropriate reaction to God's providence. When I reflect on
God's goodness and care for me, lI[glratitude of mind for the favorable
outcome of things, patience in adversity, and also incredible freedom
from worry about the future will necessarily follow upon this know 1-

BOOK REVIEWS

251

edge."s The phrase is Calvin's, who adds that "[c]ertainty about God's
providence puts joyous trust toward God in our hearts."6 An attitude of
gratitude, joyous trust, and, we could add, willing obedience, would
seem to permit a pretty good relationship with God. If it is not unreasonable for an adherent of a robust doctrine of providence to adopt it,
then such a view needs no improvement on this count.
Hasker also claims that the open view is superior to its rivals in its
capacity to deal with the problem of evil. According to the open view
God knows that evils will occur, but he has not for the most part
decreed or incorporated into his plan the individual instances of
evil. Rather, God governs the world according to general strategies, strategies which are, as a whole, ordered for the good of the
creation, but whose detailed consequences are not foreseen or
intended by God prior to the decision to adopt them. As a result
of this, we are able to ... admit the presence in the world of particular evils God's permission of which is not the means of bringing about any greater good or preventing any equal or greater
evil. (152)
No doubt the problem of evil is a serious problem for every version of
theism. And Christians of any persuasion will be hard-pressed to say,
for every particular example of evil, what greater good required it. Of
course, Christians who hold to a robust doctrine of providence are likely
to say that God has his reasons, even if we are not in a position to know
what they are. But Hasker apparently prefers to resort not to agnosticism about the justification of evil but to say rather that there are evils
which do not serve any good purpose, which are not required by any
greater good, but which occurred either because God did not anticipate
them or because in his focus on "general strategies" he did not concern
himself with them.
I fail to see how the open view is an improvement over its competitors on this point, either. In the first place, since God, on this view, "has
a vast amount of knowledge about the probabilities that free choices will
be made in one way rather than another" (151) and he has a similarly
vast knowledge of the workings of the universe, God was certainly in a
position, with respect to many of the evils that have in fact occurred, to
predict that they would occur. Indeed, it seems reasonable to think that,
on the open view, God would have been justified in believing with respect
to many such evils that they would occur, unless he intervened, even if
he did not know this with certainty. Furthermore, on this view God can
know what people are thinking and intending in the present. Thus
when he sees people with evil hearts and murderous intentions load
thousands of pounds of homemade explosives into a rented truck, God
is in a good position to predict that, unless he intervenes, tragedy will
ensue. Why would he fail to intervene, unless he could foresee that the
evil likely to ensue was required for a greater good?7 But this is precisely something that on the open view God is unable to foresee. So the open
view faces the same problem Hasker claims to beset traditional
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Christianity but with the disadvantage that on this view God is less likely to be justified in permitting evil. In other words, the open view faces
the same difficulties as traditional Christianity but with fewer resources
to meet them. That does not strike me as an advantage.
Despite the laudable concern these authors have for developing a
position that is both biblically sound and adequate for a rich religious
life, the view they present, as I have tried to make explicit, is not only a
radical departure from traditional Christianity but it is a departure not
justified by the reasons they cite in its favor.
NOTES
1. One of the authors, William Hasker, in God, Time, and Knowledge
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989) interprets this prophecy
not as conditional but as a prediction "based on foresight drawn from existing trends and tendencies" (p. 194). Under either interpretation it is possible
for the prophecy to be made but to be unfulfilled, either because the relevant
condition-whatever it is-is unsatisfied or because the current trends are
reversed or overridden.
2. J.T. McNeil's The History and Character of Calvinism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1954) is not primarily a history of the doctrine of
theological determinism!
3. See his God, Time and Knowledge and "A Refutation of Middle
Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986): 545-57.
4. See Thomas P. Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Freedom," Philosophical
Studies 60 (1990): 103-115 and "In Defense of Theological Compatibilism,"
Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991): 237-243, as well as Alfred J. Freddoso, "Review
of William Hasker: God, Time, and Knowledge," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993):
99-107.
5. Calvin, Institutes, I, xvii, 7.
6. Ibid. I, xvii, 11.
7. A similar claim may be made about the evils Hasker cites on p. 146.

The Sources of Christian Ethics, by Servais Pinckaers OP. Washington
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995. Pp. xxi and 489.
$24.95.
JAMES G. HANINK, Loyola Marymount University.
"It is difficult," Pinckaers notes, "to describe a situation while living in
the midst of all its complexity ... " (304) It's perhaps equally hard to identify a classic within a decade of its writing and a year of its translation
for Anglophone readers. Still, Pinckaers's Sources is a contender.
The author, a Belgian, teaches theology at the University of Fribourg.
Sources appeared as Les sources de la morale chretienne in 1985, and
Pinckaers tells us he wrote it for a broad audience. His text is straightforward and ambitious. Pinckaers first defines Christian ethics and then
examines its relation to the behavioral sciences, to Scripture, and to the

